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Abstract Content access control aims at ensuring that,
in a system with several resources, users can only access
resources they are authorized to. Resources are encrypted
using cryptographic keys. Generating, distributing and
renewing these keys are the challenges faced by keymanage-
ment schemes. While most of the existing key management
schemes are typically evaluated by simulation. We propose,
for the first time, to use Markovian processes for this pur-
pose. Markovian processes give more accurate evaluation.
Thekey tables-basedkeymanagement scheme for linear hier-
archies (KTLH) is a particularly interesting keymanagement
scheme; it was initially proposed for securing group com-
munications, but could easily be adapted to other application
such as wireless sensor networks. KTLH requires each user
to maintain a set of keys. The keys and size of the key set
change dynamically, making the evaluation of the overheads
of KTLH a challenging task. Our contribution is threefold,
we have (1) modeled KTLH using Markov processes, (2)
evaluated KTLH according to its storage, computation and
bandwidth overheads and compared it to existing key man-
agement schemes and (3) shown how our approach could be
generalized to other key management schemes.
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1 Introduction
Ensuring content access control is a critical security issue
within hierarchies. A hierarchy is defined using a set of
access rights (privileges), and each entity in the hierarchy
has a subset of these access rights. Content access control in
a hierarchy (CACH) is required in any context where a set
of sensitive information items should be accessed with a set
of access rights. A user might have access to particular items
while others do not. The main goal of CACH is to ensure that
users access only items to which they are entitled. CACH is
required in several contexts such as ensuring access control
to resources shared on a cloud or protecting messages in a
hierarchical group (e.g., military communications).
For example, in a multilayered video streaming applica-
tion with a basic layer quality, and N enhancement layers
(EL). A user who pays for enhancement layer ELi should be
able to access enhancement layers of lower quality, but not
to enhancement layers of higher quality. Ensuring content
access control in this example can be carried out by encrypt-
ing the different enhancement layers using different keys.
Each user will have the key of the enhancement layer they
are entitled to, as well as (the required information to get) the
keys for the enhancement layers of lower quality. These keys
are called Resource Encryption Keys (REK). Key manage-
ment for CACH aims at efficiently generating, distributing
and renewing these keys while fulfilling the security require-
ments of content access control [1].
Key management for CACH is a challenging security
problem. The key management problem has already been
addressed for flat systems. In a flat system, there is only
one data stream. That is, a user can be authorized to access
either all data or nothing. Adding a hierarchy makes the key
management more complex. Indeed, in a hierarchy, there are
several data streams, each encrypted using a different keys.
123
H. Ragab-Hassen, E. Lounes
Markov processes (aka continuous time Markov chain
CTMC) are a category of stochastic processes that have the
Markov property [2]. They have been extensively studied in
the stochastic processes literature [3–5], and interesting prop-
erties have been established for them. Numerical properties
of key management schemes can be modeled by Markov
processes.
1.1 Our contribution
In this paper, we show how to model key management
schemes using Markov models. We have chosen the key
tables-based key management scheme for linear hierarchies
(KTLH) keymanagement scheme [6] because of its complex
and random behavior. Applying Markov processes to other
key management schemes is likely to be of similar or less
complexity. Our contribution is threefold, we have (1) mod-
eled KTLH using Markov processes, (2) evaluated KTLH
according to its storage, computation and bandwidth over-
heads and compared it to existing key management schemes
and (3) shown how our approach could be generalized to
other key management schemes.
The next section reviews the problem of content access
control in hierarchies and its key management issues, and
gives an overview of the existing key management schemes
including KTLH. Our Markov model and its results are pre-
sented in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4, we evaluate the overheads of
KTLH using the results of our model.We present our conclu-
sions in Sect. 5.An appendix contains the required theoretical
background on Markov processes.
2 Related works
2.1 Content access control in hierarchies
A hierarchy can be defined in two steps. First, the enti-
ties within the system are divided into security classes (SC)
according to their access rights. Second, an ordering rela-
tion is defined on the classes. Ordering the classes is based
on the access rights. These access rights allow to say that a
class is more privileged than another, thereby defining the
hierarchy. A security class contains users who have exactly
the same access rights. Users could be individuals, devices
or processes.
A security class SCi covers (or dominates) another secu-
rity class SC j and we denote it by SCi  SC j if and only if
any user in SCi has access to all information items in SC j .
Users within the same security class could be assigned the
same role in a role-based access control (RBAC) context.
A very interesting type of hierarchy is the linear hierar-
chies. In such a hierarchy, security classes form a directed
chain. The first class in the chain is the most privileged.
Fig. 1 A classification of CACH key management schemes
Indexes can be assigned such that i < j ⇔ SCi  SC j .
That is, SC1 is the highest class.
2.2 Key management schemes for CACH
Keymanagement typical tasks areResourceEncryptionKeys
(REK) generation and renewal [1]. The REK renewal is nec-
essary to ensure confidentiality when users join or leave
the hierarchy. That is, a new user must be prevented from
accessing data exchanged before they join the hierarchy. This
requirement is called backward secrecy. Inversely, a leaving
user should not have access to data exchanged after they leave
the session (forward secrecy requirement). A renewal must
be carried out after their departure.
The existing key management schemes for CACH can
be divided into two approaches: the dependent-keys and the
independent-keys approaches [1] as shown in Fig. 1.
The independent-keys approach originates from the mul-
ticast security community. More precisely, from works on
key management, hence, these schemes use usual key trees
and graphs techniques [7]. In order to access any information
item, the user must have a copy of its decryption key.
In the dependent-keys approach, in order to access a given
information item (message), a legitimate user does not need
to have the key with which it is encrypted. But using merely
their own key, combined with some public parameters and/or
functions, they can compute the key used to decrypt the item.
The resulting key management schemes typically use com-
plex cryptographic techniques.
The dependent-keys schemes can be further divided in two
categories as shown in Fig. 2: indirect access schemes and
direct access schemes. In indirect access schemes, if SCi 
SC j , members of SCi must compute all intermediate keys
on the path from SCi to SC j in order to be able to compute
the key of SC j . Sandhu [8,9], Gudes [10] and Yang and Li
[11] proposed indirect schemes that are based on one-way
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Fig. 2 Indirect and direct key management schemes
functions. In these schemes, the key of a class is computed
from the key of its parent using a one-way function.
A direct scheme avoids the computation of intermedi-
ate keys by using additional public parameters. Most of the
schemes proposed in this approach use prime numbers fun-
damental properties (Akl and Taylor [12], Ray et al. [13],
Zou et al. [14]) and other theoretical cryptographic notions
(Hardjono et al. [15] and Zheng et al.[16]). Shen and Chen
[17], Zhang et al. [18], Tzang et al. [19] and Das et al. [20]
used Newton’s polynomial interpolation to correlate classes’
indices with their keys.
2.2.1 Discussion
Independent-keys schemes are quite simple to deploy. How-
ever, they do not offer an efficient support for hierarchy
changes. On the other hand, dependent-keys schemes have
the advantage of minimizing the number of keys maintained
by users. This is carried out using well-chosen public para-
meters. However, in most of the schemes proposed in this
approach, the number of public parameters is quite impor-
tant which obsoletes the idea of reducing storage on user’s
side. One-way functions-based techniques is a good solu-
tion for storage overhead issues. In these techniques, keys of
the security classes are iteratively generated using a one-way
function (possibly combined one ormore public parameters).
Linking the keys using such functions allows replacing a set
of keys by only one key. Nevertheless, changing one key in a
set of related keys implies the renewal of the whole set. This
generates an additional renewal overhead. KTLH is based on
one-way functions but uses a keys table mechanism to avoid
renewing the whole set of keys. It is important to understand
how KTLH works before we describe our model. We will
briefly recall it in the next section.
2.3 KTLH
KTLH is a dependent-keys key management scheme for lin-
ear hierarchies. KTLH allows users to join and leave the
hierarchy, as well as to be promoted (moving to a higher
class) or degraded (moving to a lower class) within the hier-
archy.
KTLH links keys in such a way that, knowing their own
keys table, a user can compute keys of lower classes. Keys
tables are used in KTLH to maintain the links between the
keys.
Initially, KTLH generates a random key K1 and uses a
hash functionH to compute a chain of keys using the formula:
Kc+1 = H(Kc), where Kc is the key of the cth class. Then
each key Kc is sent to its corresponding class SCc. Thus, only
one key is sent to each user. Once a user in class SCc receives
their key, they can, if required, compute the key of any class
SCu , SCu < SCc, by simply applying (u −c) times H to Kc.
Since the keys are renewed several times, we denote by K pc
the key of SCc after the (p − 1)th key renewal. That is, p is
the version of the key. The initial key of SCc is denoted K 1c .
The novelty in KTLH is the use of keys tables to maintain
the key chain. Initially, the table of a user in SCc only contains
the pair (c, K 1c ), where K
1
c is the initial key of SCc. The keys
tables evolve with the hierarchy membership changes. For
instance, when a user leaves the cth class, the key K 1c of SCc
and keys of all lower (but not higher) classes are renewed
(because the leaving user knows them). An update message,
containing the pair (c, K 2c ), is sent to higher classes who
update their keys tables by adding an entry to it to contains
the pair. So, for example, users in class 1 will have in their
keys tables, in addition to the pair (1, K 21 ), the pair (c, K
2
c ).
Note that the key of SC1 remains unchanged. This is why its
upper index (version) remains the same.
Obviously, if the update messages are not used, users in
SC1 will not be able to find K 2c . This is because it was not
computed based on K 1c−1 usingH. In order to overcome chain
discontinuity problem, users maintain keys tables. Each time
that a user receives an update message, they make necessary
updates to their keys tables. Later on, when they need to
compute the key of a lower class u, the user looks in their
table for the greatest class index c such that c ≤ u. KTLH is
a dependent-keys key management scheme because it uses a
one-way function. The next examples illustrates how KTLH
builds keys tables.
Example Let us consider a system with five security classes
(C = 5). Initially, every user needs to know only her own
class key. Assume that a user in SC2 has just been demoted to
SC4. In order to prevent this user from accessing future com-
munications/information items of SC2 and SC3, K 12 and K
1
3
must be renewed. Note that K 14 does not need to be changed
since the user had access to it before moving to SC2 and
will keep that access after moving. KTLH generates a new
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3 = H(K 22 ).
That is, the new content encryption keys are K 22 and K
2
3 ,




5 remain unchanged. KTLH sends
K 22 to users in SC2 and K
2
3 to those in SC3. It also sends
keys tables update messages to SC1, SC2 and SC3; users of
SC2 and SC3 will receive only one message containing the
pair (K 24 , 4), whereas users of SC1 will receive two mes-
sages: the first containing (K 22 , 2) and the second containing
(K 24 , 4).
Upon receiving these messages, users of SC1 will update
their keys tables to look like Table 1, while users of SC3 will
get Table 2.
3 A Markov process model for KTLH
We will evaluate KTLH according to the following metrics:
(1) Key Storage the average number of keys that each user
has to store within their keys table;
(2) Computation Time the average number of computations
of the one-way function that a user should carry out to
compute the key of a lower class.
(3) Bandwidth number of messages sent per user in order to
make key renewals when a membership change occurs.
We propose to model KTLH using aMarkov process in order
to evaluate these performance criteria. A Markov process is
a stochastic process whose future state, given the present
state does not depend on the past. That is, the conditional
probability distribution of the process depends only on the
present state [21]. Appendix 1 contains a summary of the
Markov processes properties we are using in this paper.
Our objective is to model the system characteristics by a
Markov process and then use the limiting distribution of the
Markov process to compute the average value of themodeled
variable. This value will serve us as a means to compute the
storage and computation overheads.
Let us consider a hierarchy with N classes and let Zt (c)
be the number of keys within keys tables of a member of
Fig. 3 Keys tables size process
SCc. Obviously, Zt (c) is a particularly interesting process
because it directly gives the storage overhead, and the aver-
age value of Zt (c) is the average key storage. We thought it
is worth justifying to the reader why we decided not to use
this process. Indeed, Zt (c) is not a Markov process because
the size of the table of SCc after a given membership change
can have several values independently from its size before
the membership change. In other words, the future probabil-
ity distribution of the table size is not fully determined by
knowing its current size. We give a counterexample below to
show that Zt (c) is not a Markov process.
Let Zt (1) be number of keys within the keys table of SC1.
Suppose that the system contains 10 classes and that the cur-
rent keys table size is 3. Suppose that a member joins the
system at SC5. If the keys table initially contains K 11 , K
2
2
and K 34 (Fig. 3a), then after the key renewal the keys table






5 (the key of SC5 is renewed),
and hence, the new keys table size is 4. However, if the keys




8 (Fig. 3b), then after
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(note that there is no more need to keep K 26 and K
3
8 because
their new versions can be obtained, thanks to KTLH and the
keys table mechanism, from the new key K 45 ). The new keys
table size is 2. That is, Zt (1) has not the same value for both
cases after the membership change even if it had the same
size, 3, before it. This is due to the fact that Zt (1) depends on
the contents of the keys table, which is related to the process
history, thus fulfilling the Markov property. In what follows,
we will consider an alternative process which is a Markov
one.
3.1 The “Next Discontinuity” process
Let N be the number of security classes. We say that there
is a chain discontinuity between two successive classes SCi
and SCi+1 if Ki+1 cannot be computed by applying the one-
way function to Ki (e.g., due to the previous key renewal
triggered by a user leaving SCi ). We define the distance
from any class SCc (SCc  SCi ) to this discontinuity as
(i + 1) − c. By convention, we consider that there is a chain
discontinuity just after the last class SCN . Let Xt (c) be the
distance from SCc to the next discontinuity in the key chain at
time t.
An example of the values of Xt (c) is shown in Fig. 4.
Xt (c) is a Markov process. Indeed, Xt (c) depends only on
its last value and themembership change that occurs. In other
words, the membership change determines in a unique way
the next value of Xt (c) conjointly with its previous value
(and this does not depend on older history). Since there is
a chain discontinuity just after SCN , the maximum value of
Xt (c) is N − c + 1, i.e., Xt (c) ∈ {1, . . . , N − c + 1}. For
Fig. 4 Chain discontinuity process
example, the maximum distance between SC3 and the next
discontinuity is 10 − 3 + 1 = 8. In Fig. 4, this distance is 3
but it can change when membership changes occur.
We denote by EXc the average value of Xt (c). That is,
EXc is the average distance from SCc to the next disconti-
nuity. Note that EXc does not depend on t but only depends
on the class.
EXc can be used to compute the key storage and the com-
putation overheads. For example, let us say we find that for
a hierarchy of 50 classes, EXc = 5 for all values of c. This
means that the average distance from the first class to the
first discontinuity is five classes, then the distance from the
first discontinuity to the second is five classes as well and
so on. That is, the whole key chain can be divided, by the
chain discontinuities, into 10 segments of five classes each.
Each chain discontinuity corresponds to a key that should
be stored by higher classes, so (in average) the maximum
number of keys that a class should store is the number of dis-
continuities, which is 10 in our case (stored by users of SC1
for example). Furthermore, because each segment contains
only five classes, a user would need to apply the hash func-
tion no more than four times (5−1). As you can see in this
example, knowing the value of EXc would allow to estimate
the overheads of KTLH.
We denote by Q(c) the transition matrix1 of Xt (c). Q(c)
gives the rates at which Xt (c) changes its value. In what
follows, we give its analytical form for all values of c. Q(c)
will be used to study the existence of the limiting distribution,
πc, of Xt (c).
The reason we need to study the existence of the limiting
distributionπc is that, when it exists,πc gives the probability
that Xt (c) (t big enough) is in the state i. Then, the average













πc(i) = 1 (2)
Allowing us to find EXc for any class c.
In the rest of this section, we determine the transition
matrix Q(c) of Xt (c) in 3.2; then we use Q(c) in order to
determine EXc, the average value of Xt (c), in 3.3.
1 We consider transition matrices such that the sum of each row is 1.
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Table 3 Used notations
Notation Meaning
N Number of security classes
SCc The cth security class
Xt (c) The distance from SCt to the next discontinuity at time t
E Xc The average value of Xt (c)
 The events probability matrix
ωx,y An element of 
Q(c) The transition matrix of Xt (c)
qx,y An element of Q(c)
πc The limiting distribution of Xt (c)
3.2 The transition matrix of Xt(c): Q(c)
We denote by ωx,y the probability of the event “a user will
switch from SCx to SCy .”By convention, SC0 contains exter-
nal hosts. That is, ω0,y is the probability that an external
host joins the class SCy and ωx,0 is the probability that a





y=0 ωx,y = 1. We define  as the
(N + 1) × (N + 1) matrix having ωx,y as entries.  will be
used to compute Q(c). Note that  is not a transition matrix.
Table 3 summarizes the notations we will use.
Q(c) is a (N − c + 1) × (N − c + 1) matrix because
Xt (c) ∈ {1, . . . , N − c + 1}. Obviously, in order to obtain
concrete values of πc, we need to have concrete values of
Q(c) (cf. equation system 2). However, in order to stay as
general as possible, we will not use numerical values for
Q(c), but we have rather chosen to consider the model where
themembership change rate is the same for any pair of classes
SCx and SCy ; i.e., a user has the same probability to stay in
their class as to switch to any other class. Our approach can
still be applied in the same way to other values of Q(c). In
other words, all the entries of the transition matrix  are














y=0 ωx,y = 1, we obtain for all x, y:
ωx,y = ω = 1
(N + 1)2 (3)
Let us denote by qx,y the elements of Q(c). Since Q(c)
depends on the value of c, we distinguish three cases: c = N ,
c = 1 and 2 ≤ c ≤ N − 1.
(1) c = N.
Xt (N ) ∈ {1}. The process Xt (N ) has a constant value
and is permanently equal to 1. Q(N) is a 1 × 1 matrix
containing one element: q1,1 = 1.
(2) c = 1.
Xt (1) ∈ {1, . . . , N }, Q(N) is a N × N matrix. We dis-






N 2 + 3
(N + 1)2 , if y = 1
2
(N + 1)2 , if 2 ≤ y ≤ N − 1
2
(N + 1)2 , if y = N
(4)
These formulas are based on KTLH operations. For
example, q1,N (last line of equation system 4) gives
the rates at which the distance from SC1 to the next
chain discontinuity changes from 1 to N. According
to the formula above, q1,N = 2(N+1)2 . This is because
having a distance of N to the next chain discontinuity
means that there is no chain discontinuity but the one
after SCN (by convention). This situation only happens
when a user joins or leaves SC1. A join to SC1 occurs
with the rate ω0,1 = 1(N+1)2 (i.e., from SC0 to SC1,
SC0 is the set of external hosts). A leave occurs with







(N+1)2 , if y = 1
2(N−y+1)
(N+1)2 , if 2 ≤ y ≤ N − 1
N+3
(N+1)2 , if y = N
(5)






(N+1)2 , if 1 ≤ y ≤ x − 1
N+3+(N−x)(N−x+1)
(N+1)2 , if y = x
2
(N+1)2 , if x + 1 ≤ y ≤ N − 1
2
(N+1)2 , if y = N
(6)
(3) 2 ≤ c ≤ N-1
Xt (c) ∈ {1, . . . , N − c + 1}, Q(c) is a (N − c + 1) ×






(N+1)2 , if y = 1
2c
(N+1)2 , if 2 ≤ y ≤ N − c
c2+c








(N+1)2 , if y = 1
2(N−y+1)
(N+1)2 , if 2 ≤ y ≤ N − c
N+1+c2+c
(N+1)2 , if y = N − c + 1
(8)
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(N+1)2 , if y = x
2c
(N+1)2 , if x + 1 ≤ y ≤ N − c
c2+c
(N+1)2 , if y = N − c + 1
(9)
3.3 Average value of Xt(c) : EXc
Using the values of qx,y , we can give the next theorem:
Theorem 1 (Existence of the Limiting Distribution): The








πc(i) = 1 (10)
Proof Since qi, j > 0 for all c, 1 ≤ c ≤ N and all
i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N −c+1}, any two states are communicating.
Furthermore, {1, . . . , N − c + 1} is a finite set. Therefore,
according to theorem 2 in Appendix A, πc exists and is the
unique solution of the above equation system. unionsq
We have solved, using MATLAB, equation system 10 for
several values of N ranging from 2 to 1000. This allowed us
to find πc values for each value ofN. Note that for each value
ofN there is a whole set of πcs (a πc for each class c between
1 and N). Then, for each value of N, we used Eq. 1 to find
the values of EXc (1 ≤ c ≤ N ).
For each value of N, we distinguish three cases depending
on the value of c
(1) c = N : Xt (N ) is constant and equals 1. Therefore, its
average value, EXN , equals 1.
(2) c = 1 : According to Fig. 5, we see that EX1 is a linear
function of log(N ). Therefore, EX1 is in O(log(N )).
(3) For c between 2 and ≤ N − 1 : In order to have the
most reliable results, we have considered different values of
N while varying c. Figures 6 and 7 show EXc as a function
of log(N ), for 60 ≤ N ≤ 200 and 10 ≤ c ≤ 20 (cf. Fig. 6 ),
and 700 ≤ N ≤ 1000 and 180 ≤ c ≤ 280 (cf. Fig. 7 ). As
for the case where c = 1, we observe here that EXc has a
linear shape as a function of log(N ).
4 Discussion
These results suggest that the average distance to the next
discontinuity is of complexity O(log(N )) where N is the
Fig. 5 EX1 as a function of log(N )
Fig. 6 EXc as a function of log(N )
Fig. 7 EXc as a function of log(N )
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number of security classes. Our extensive tests confirmed
this hypothesis.
4.1 Evaluation of KTLH
4.1.1 Key storage overhead
Since EXc is of complexity O(log(N )), the average distance
from the first discontinuity to the second one is O(log(N )),
the averagedistance from the seconddiscontinuity to the third
is O(log(N )) and so on. Therefore, the whole key chain can
be divided into K segments, each segment is of O(log(N ))
classes. That is, K is O( Nlog(N ) )
Each chain discontinuity corresponds to a key that should
be stored by higher classes, the maximum number of keys
that a class should store is the number of discontinuities K.
It follows that the key storage complexity is O( Nlog(N ) ).
4.1.2 Computation overhead
Since the key chain is split into segments of O(log(N ))
classes, the maximum number of computations a user needs
to do is the length of the segment, which is O(log(N )). That
is, the computation overhead is O(log(N )).
4.1.3 Bandwidth overhead
When a user leaves or joins a security class SCc, this results
in the renewal of the key of their class and all lower classes.
This is done by generating new keys for their class and lower
classes and sending, to each class, its new key. Also, the
new key of SCc has to be sent to all higher classes. That
is, each class in the system will need to receive exactly one
message, whatever its position is in the hierarchy. The band-
width overhead in this case is O(1). On the other hand, if a
user is promoted or demoted, then two chain discontinuities
are created. Classes above the higher discontinuity will need
to receive two new keys, whereas all other classes will need
to receive only one (as shown in the example in 2.3). The
number of messages that need to be sent is smaller or equal
to a constant (2), and thus, the bandwidth overhead is O(1)
in this case as well. Table 4 shows these results.
Table 4 Performance measures of KTLH
Computation Key storage Bandwidth
O(log(N )) O( Nlog(N ) ) O(1)
Table 5 A comparison of overheads of the dependent-keys approaches
Approach Computation Storage Bandwidth
Indirect O(N ) O(log(N )) O(N )
[9,11]
Direct 
 O((N 2)) O(1) O(N )
[12,13],
[17,20]
KTLH O(log(N)) O( Nlog(N ) ) O(1)
4.2 Comparison to the existing schemes
KTLH is a dependent-keys key management scheme. The
complexity of some of the existing dependent-keys key man-
agement schemes [9,11–13,17,20] when applied to linear
hierarchies was evaluated in [6]. Table 5 uses this evaluation
and compares the complexity of KTLH to the dependent-
keys schemes, namely direct and indirect schemes. Optimal
overheads are highlighted.
KTLH has the best computation overhead, and it is the
only scheme that gives an overhead that is less than the linear
overhead (O(N)). It also has the lowest bandwidth overhead.
On the other hand, The indirect and direct approaches have a
better storage overhead. The fact of staying below the O(N)
bound for all overheads gives KTLH some advantage over
the direct and indirect approaches, particularly if used for
devices with limited capacity or within hierarchies with big
numbers of classes.
4.3 Generalization to other key management schemes
Even if our transition matrix is specific to KTLH, the reason-
ing and methodological steps we presented in this paper can
be applied to other key management schemes.
Finding the matrix  (that we defined to contain the
switching probabilities from a class x to a class y) will prob-
ably have to be the first step and the corner stone in any
application of Markov processes to the evaluation of a key
management scheme.
Furthermore, the technique we used to solve equation
system (10) and find EXc can be easily used by other key
management schemes evaluation works when faced by com-
plex equation systems.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we provided a theoretical evaluation of the
performance of KTLH. We used the Markov processes in
order to model the distance to next discontinuity from each
class. We demonstrated that the average distance to the next
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discontinuity is of O(log(N )), where N is the total number
of classes. Using this result, we concluded that, for KTLH,
the average key storage per user is O( Nlog(N ) ), the average
computation overhead is O(log(N )), and the average band-
width overhead per key renewal isO(1). Comparison to other
dependent-keys schemes showed that KTLH tunes storage,
computation and bandwidth overheads to achieve good per-
formance trade-offs. Future works can extend ourMarkovian
approach to evaluate other key management schemes as
explained in the previous section.
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Appendix
The Markov property
A stochastic process {Xt , t ≥ 0} is a family of random vari-
ables Xt where t is an indexing parameter, t is usually time.
The set of values (states) in which Xt takes its values is called
the state space S.
Let {Xt , t ≥ 0} be a stochastic process. TheMarkov prop-
erty states that the conditional distribution of Xt at time t + s
(s, t ≥ 0) given the history of the process up to and including
time t depends only on the state of the process at time t. In
other words, the state of the process at time t + s is condi-
tionally independent of the history of the process before time
t, given the state of the process at time t. We give hereafter a
formal definition of Markov processes.
Definition 1 (Markov Process):A stochastic process {X (t),
t ≥ 0} is a Markov process if for all s, t ≥ 0 and nonnegative
integers i, j, xu , 0 ≤ u < s:
P{Xs+t = j |Xs = i, Xu = xu, 0 ≤ u < s}
= P{Xs+t = j |Xs = i} (11)
Definition 2 (StateDistributionVector):Let Xt be aMarkov
process defined on the state space S = {1, . . . , N }. The state
distribution vector πt is defined by πt = (πt (1), . . . , πt (N ))
where πt (i) = P{Xt = i} for all i ∈ S.
The state distribution vector πt defines for each time t the
probability distribution of Xt .
The transition matrix
The entries of the transition (rate) matrix Q give at which
rate the process moves from a state to another. Entries of Q
are defined by:
qi, j = lim
h→0
P{Xt+h = j |Xt = i}
h
(12)
The sum of each row of this matrix is equal to 1. If
P{Xt+s = j |Xt = i} does not depend on t, then Xt is
said to be homogenous. In this case, we denote by pi, j (s)
the probability P{Xt+s = j |Xt = i}.
Limiting distribution
Definition 3 (Communicating states and irreducibility [4]):
Two states i, j ∈ S are said to communicate if there are
t1, t2 > 0 such that: pi, j (t1) > 0 and p j,i (t2) > 0. The
Markov process is irreducible if any two states in S can com-
municate.
Definition 4 (Stationary distribution vector): The station-
ary distribution vector π verifies:
π.Q = π (13)
and the normalization condition:
∑
i
π(i ∈ S) = 1 (14)
Definition 5 (Limiting distribution vector): The limiting
distribution vector π∗ is defined by:
π∗ = lim
t→∞ πt (15)
when this limit exists
Theorem 2 (Existence of the limiting distribution [4]): The
stationary distribution vector π of an irreducible Markov
process on an finite state space is unique. π is also the lim-
iting distribution.
That is, the limiting distribution π of an irreducible Markov
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